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Executive Summary 
Hydroelectric dam building in the global south has become a way for countries to shift 
away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy sources that utilize the natural resources 
that they have at hand. Rapid dam construction is not without consequences, though, both for the 
people and the environment. The Mekong River Basin, with numerous dams and reservoirs, has 
been an example of the economic and political risks of large dams, as well as issues of food and 
water security. Other countries in the global south have followed suit, with the promise of 
international funding for dam construction, the ability to meet clean energy goals, and the 
potential for an economically secure future being drivers of many major dam projects. 
This report aims to summarize and analyze: 
● Factors that are driving the rapid construction of hydropower projects, on both a 
national and international level 
● The role of transboundary organizations on water management and dam 
construction in river basins that contain hydropower projects 
● The environmental and social impacts of dam construction 
 We conclude that some areas that have been rapidly constructing dams are now slowing 
the pace of hydropower projects as they transition to other alternative energy sources, but other 
countries have only just begun and still have many projects in the works. Transboundary 
organizations on the river basins we examined, which focus on International Water Resource 
Management (IWRM), organize cooperative projects for sustainable development, but tend to 
have limited power over dam construction. The countries themselves still have the power to 
determine whether or not they want to continue with hydropower projects. And, finally, countries 
often emphasize the importance of sustainability and renewable energy, but ultimately 
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environmental concerns may not be valued over promising economic opportunities. 
Introduction 
As part of an international trend towards renewable energy, many countries in the global 
south have turned to the construction of hydropower dams, as a way to meet their energy needs 
while reducing their impact on the environment. However, this alternative energy source can 
have negative impacts on the environment as well, particularly in the face of climate change. 
Additionally, the upfront costs of installing hydropower projects are high, and often countries 
cannot afford to pay for them on their own, resulting in the need to take out loans from foreign 
investors. This report analyzes current trends in hydropower in the global south, on the Mekong, 
Amazon, Nile, and Zambezi river basins. We explore trends from both a national and basin-wide 
perspective, breaking down the potential influence of outside funding sources and transboundary 
organizations on dam construction. Through this analysis, we posit that: 
1.  Some regions are experiencing a slowdown in hydro dam construction, while others are 
just getting started 
2. With increasing global attention to changing climate patterns, dams emerge as a solution 
to some but part of the problem to others 
3. Transboundary management organizations (TBOs) have been primarily supported by 
international institutions, but there is a push for state and regional ownership and 
participation 
Methodology & Case Selection 
This report consists of a summary and analysis of transboundary water management and 
global trends in dam building on the Amazon, the Mekong, the Zambezi, and the Nile rivers. The 
research was done through a literature review, which included sources such as academic journal 
articles, books, the websites of transboundary organizations and non-profit organizations, 
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government documents, and recent news articles and videos. The Mekong River was used as a 
comparison case for this research, as the Stimson Center has done extensive research on dam 
building in this area. The Mekong is a prime example of rapid development in hydro-dam 
projects, which can be economically and politically risky, as well as lead to issues involving food 
and water security. 
The following rivers, and countries of focus within these river basins, were selected for 
comparative research: 
● The Nile River (Egypt and Ethiopia) 
● The Zambezi River (Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique) 
● The Amazon River (Ecuador and Brazil) 
A combination of the presence of transboundary water management organizations as well 
as the recent and ongoing construction of large dams in these areas formed the basis on which 
these cases were selected. Additionally, cases in the global south were selected for comparison 
with the Mekong, to better evaluate economic factors, international water resource management, 
and the influence of outside actors. Finally, we aimed to cover a variety of drivers and effects of 
dam construction through the selection of these cases, which ranged from potential impacts on 
tourism in the face of climate change (in the Zambezi and Ecuador) to shifts to renewable energy 
sources other than hydropower (Brazil and Egypt). 
Background on Large Dams 
In many developing economies, large and major dam projects are perceived as vital 
infrastructure and energy investments that reap benefits by providing needed energy, manage 
distribution of water resources, and can operate over a long period of time. Large dams are 
defined by the International Commission on Large Dams as a dam larger than 15 meters tall, 
 
5 
with major dams categorized as over 150 meters tall, with over 25km3 of reservoir storage, or 
producing over 1,000 megawatts of power (ICOLD, 2018). There are currently nearly 60,000 
large dams. Around the world, dams are used for a variety of purposes, the most common being 
irrigation, water supply, flood control, and hydroelectric power generation. Hydroelectric dams 
are used to achieve economic growth through energy production and further infrastructure 
expansion promoting regional connectivity, while also addressing global movement towards 
other renewable energy options. Today, hydroelectric dams provide around one-fifth of the 
world’s electricity. While dams producing hydroelectric power emerged in North America at the 
beginning of the 20th century and jump-started countries like the United States and Canada as 
hydroelectricity producers, new growth of hydropower in North America, Europe, and Japan has 
slowed substantially, as most potential has already been exploited. Currently, the largest 
producers of hydroelectric power are China (331,110 MW), the United States (102,485 MW), 
and Brazil (98,015 MW) (IHA, 2016). Other emerging economies like India, Turkey, and Russia 
also produce large amounts of hydroelectric power. 
Dam-affected communities and environmental advocates lobbied international 
institutions such as the World Bank to review the impacts of dams and to set international 
standards that address and mitigate negative social and environmental effects from dam 
construction. The World Commission on Dams was the first comprehensive global review of the 
dams and their contribution to development. The investigation was conducted independently by a 
group of commissioners representing a variety of stakeholders, including dam critics and 
proponents. The report, published in 2000, highlighted the impacts of large dams and strategies 
to manage human  rights, the right to development, and assessing the risks of projects (WCD, 
2000). For an international standard on decision making, the report suggested of reaching 
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negotiated outcomes transparently with all stakeholders. This recommendation attempted to alter 
and go beyond the norm of ‘informed consent’ or consultation with affected communities. 
Furthermore, the conclusions of the report recommended that “large dams be built under a set of 
internationally agreed norms that were aligned with international laws and principles...dams 
should be financed only after raising the quality of dam design to the level of best practices.” 
(Goodland, 2010). The findings of the report confirmed assertions by dam critics that risks and 
impacts of large dam projects had been underemphasized in development planning, and urged 
more participatory decision making in order to truly assess environmental and social tradeoffs. 
One major critique from a variety of dam proponents in developing countries is that the 
international norms proposed by the World Commission on Dams come from the Global North 
and would impede the development of the Global South with restrictive regulations. After the 
report was released, governments such as India, Turkey, and China disputed the findings, citing 
them as prejudiced, aggressive, and in the pocket of nuclear and thermal energy investors to 
undermine hydropower as a source of energy (McCully, 2001). The friction between the the right 
to development and environmental and social rights for low-income countries underlines the 
tension between contemporary infrastructure development in the Global South and past 
development in the Global North, which was at one point almost unhindered by environmental, 
financial, and social regulations. 
Impacts 
The impacts of dams on the environment and the surrounding communities have been 
highlighted by environmental and human rights activists as well as dam-affected communities as 
reasons to halt, delay, or modify dam construction. According to dam opponents, large dam 
projects do not serve the economic growth goals of states because of increased political and 
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financial risk, as well as negative social and environmental impacts that outweigh the benefits of 
the projects.   
On the one hand, hydroelectric dams provide around one-fifth of the world’s electricity. 
In South and Central America, nearly 60% of electricity generated comes from hydropower 
(McCully, 2001). Dams also provide water to support food production. The World Commission 
on Dams estimated that dams contribute 12-16% of world food production with their water 
resources (WCD, 2000). 
However, large dam projects also have impacts on the ecosystem. Changes in river flow 
from upstream to downstream has effects on riverbanks, deltas, and coastline due to the trapping 
of sediments in dams. With dams reducing natural flooding, agriculture in areas that receive rich 
sediment deposits in the floodplain can severely reduce agricultural production. In addition, 
many fish are no longer are able to spawn up rivers, and some species are affected by 
morphological changes to their habitats and changes in water temperature due to altered water 
flows. With the decline in fish species, the livelihoods of river communities are also substantially 
impacted. In the Mekong Delta, three-quarters of the 70 million people in the basin rely on 
fisheries or farming as a source of income and food (UNEP, 2006). 
Large projects also can have social and economic impacts throughout the basin, 
especially among river communities. The WCD estimated that 40-80 million people have been 
displaced by dam construction (WCD, 2000). Displacement is often forced, and affected 
communities are usually undercompensated for their land and livelihoods. 
Although hydroelectricity is purported to be clean, renewable, and cheap, research has 
shown that there are substantial methane and carbon dioxide emissions from rotting vegetation in 
dam reservoirs, contributing to climate change (Deemer et al, 2016). When compared to non 
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renewables like oil, gas, and coal, hydropower has an environmental advantage, but still 
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. 
Trends 
New drivers of development and changing political landscapes have shifted how dam 
development is perceived in the almost twenty years following the report. Water and energy 
demand has increased, with energy demand expected to almost double from 5.2 to 9.3 terawatts 
between 2010 and 2035 (IEA, 2011). Climate change has also changed hydropower expansion--
some actors promote hydropower as a carbon neutral energy strategy, while others note that dams 
on river basins experiencing drought conditions result in volatile and diminished power 
production due to reduced water flow. Political factors like the emergence of environmental and 
social justice movements in countries at least somewhat responsive to civil society draw political 
attention via protests, lawsuits, and advocacy to improve public consultation efforts for projects. 
Regional power struggles over scarce water resources also drive the desire to grow as quickly as 
possible. In the past, hydropower was considered to have low operating costs once constructed 
and a long life, especially when compared with non-renewable sources of energy. However, 
volatile energy output from dams, cost overruns, and a large burden of public debt have made 
large dam projects seem more financially risky to investors, particularly without substantial 
government subsidies. In an evaluation of a selection of large dam projects, 3 out of 4 dams had 
a cost overrun, which averaged 96% higher than the estimated cost, with a median overrun of 
27% over cost. In addition, 8 out of 10 dams had a schedule overrun, taking on average around 
two years longer than expected to finish construction (Ansar et al, 2014). Despite these increased 
financial risks, in some cases dams are perceived as a viable and valuable form of infrastructure 
development.   
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 Projections from the International Energy Agency for 2017-2022 forecast of a slowing 
down of hydropower capacity growth worldwide, primarily due to slowdowns in Brazil and 
China. Around one-fifth of the growth is attributed to pumped storage plants, which store water 
in reservoirs at times of low electricity demand and release water for energy production at times 
of high demand (IEA, 2017). In areas with regionally connected grids, power can be exported, 
contributing to domestic revenues and enticing foreign investment. 
 While international and regional development banks like the World Bank used to fund 
large dam projects in the 1960s and 1970s, they have since moved away from new projects in 
favor of dam refurbishment, grid efficiency improvements, or alternative renewables like wind 
and solar. However, the capacity for wind and solar expansion at a larger scale may only be 
available to emerging middle income economies with some of the grid infrastructure, 
government supports, and capital access to invest in the emerging technologies: “While some 
non-OECD countries are developing a portfolio of renewable energy capacity (e.g. Brazil, China 
and India), medium-term deployment in most countries still hinges on cheap and abundant 
hydropower resources” (Bahar, 2017). Although the global price of wind and solar has decreased 
substantially over the past few years, wind and solar face similar excess supply and storage 
issues as hydropower, and must also have institutional and financial supports in order to be 
integrated into the state’s energy portfolio at a larger scale. 
Other investors have emerged to fund hydropower projects to more equitably share risks.  
As public utilities have begun to deregulate and privatize, public-private partnership models 
were developed to increase private financing. China is also prominent as a funding partner of 
new projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, following its infrastructure development 
strategy, One Belt, One Road, which will invest almost a trillion dollars a year on infrastructure 
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investments around the world in the next decade (Dollar, 2015).   
Regional conflicts between riparian states are not a new phenomenon, but become 
increasingly important as water resources become more scarce and countries desire economic 
growth. These conflicts highlight the importance of international and regional cooperation at a 
basin-wide level in order to sustainably manage water resources. The World Commission on 
Dams report placed the spotlight on the impacts of large dams and made suggestions for policy 
change to increase cooperation. However, in some cases the power dynamics between riparians 
and the desire for economic growth may not have dampened the inclination towards hydropower 
and dams. In other cases, factors such as climate change and increased political and financial 
risks have made dams less desirable as a strategy for development. The table below summarizes 
descriptive characteristics of our selected cases. 
Summary Matrix for Selected River Basins 
Factor Mekong Amazon Nile Zambezi 
Length of River 4,909 km 6,992 km 6,853 km 2,574 km 
Number of 
Riparians 
6 8 11 6 
Name of Major 
Dams 
Xayaburi, Don 
Sahong, Pak 
Beng 
Coca Codo 
Sinclair, Belo 
Monte 
Renaissance, 
Tekkeze   
Kariba, Cohora 
Bassa, Batoka 
Gorge 
Hydroelectric 
Installed 
Capacity 
25,000 MW 78,000 MW 
(Brazil) 
1,964 MW 
(Ethiopia) 
 
5,000 MW 
Hydroelectric 
Potential 
29,000 MW 
Upper 
30,000 MW 
Lower 
≈60,000 MW 15,409 MW 
(Ethiopia) 
20,000 MW 
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Hydroelectric Capacity and Potential: A path to development 
Compared to countries in the Global North, countries in the Global South have exploited 
much less of their hydropower resources. The untapped potential of the river basins is seen as an 
economic resource that can foster foreign and domestic investment, spurring growth and meeting 
energy demand. In our selected cases, we outline how the main riparians have built out their 
installed hydropower capacity and their energy projections for the near future. In some cases, 
energy demand is easily met by the dams that already exist, but in others, high and increasing 
demand must be met by expanding other sources of energy. 
The Mekong River Basin 
The Mekong River, the eighth longest in the world at 4,909 kilometers, flows through 
China, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Lao PDR. The basin is divided into two parts, 
the Upper Mekong (Lancang) Basin in mountainous China and the Lower Mekong Basin 
flowing through floodplains and lowlands. The estimated hydroelectric potential of the Lower 
Basin is 30,000 MW, and the potential for the Upper basin is 29,000 MW (MRC, 2018). There 
are currently over 100 dams planned or installed on the Mekong River and its tributaries. 
The six riparian states of the basin all have ambitious development goals that aim to 
promote economic growth. Laos strives to reduce poverty and leave behind its ‘Least Developed 
Country’ status. To do so, it wants to export its surplus hydroelectric power to its neighbors and 
become the ‘battery of Southeast Asia.’ However, the country has few economic resources and 
must rely on outside investors to fund dam projects, often in a build-own-operate-transfer model. 
Current dams under construction in Laos include the Pak Beng and Xayaburi dams in the north, 
and the Don Sahong dam in the south (International Rivers, 2018). Of 11 proposed mainstream 
dams in the Mekong region, 9 are in Laos. 
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Cambodia has struggled to meet basic electricity needs in electrifying rural areas and 
connecting power grids throughout the country. Only about a tenth of its hydropower potential 
has been exploited, but the country still has to import some electricity from its neighbors. The 
Lower Sesan II dam, in construction on a Cambodia tributary of the Mekong partially completed, 
is projected to deplete fish stocks in the basin by 9.3%, which would devastate the fishery-reliant 
economy (International Rivers, 2018). 
Vietnam and Thailand, on the other hand, have higher incomes and more sophisticated 
power generation and distribution systems. They seek to import hydroelectricity as well as 
expanding coal and the use of renewables like solar and wind. In addition to high relative power 
consumption in the region, Vietnam and Thailand have high projected energy demand growth, 
with demand in Vietnam growing 10-12% annually (Eyler & Weatherby, 2017). 
Although China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of electricity and 
hydropower, energy demand is slated to decrease in the coming decades. In addition, China has 
increased their domestic capacity in hydropower, wind, and solar, reducing its reliance on 
imports from its neighbors. The six cascade dams upstream in China’s Yunnan province have 
provided hydropower domestically, as well as influencing water flows downstream. 
Brazil 
Other than China, Brazil is the largest producer of hydropower in the world, with over 
two-thirds of its electricity generation coming from hydroelectric power. Dams have historically 
been important in Brazil, particularly the Itaipu Dam on the Paraná River near the Paraguay-
Brazil border. In 2015 and 2016, the Itaipu Dam surpassed the largest dam in the world, the 
Three Gorges Dam in China, in energy production for the first time, producing 103.1 
terawatt/hours of power in one year (Ingram, 2016). Most of the unexploited hydropower 
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potential is in the Amazon region of Brazil, containing the Amazon River and its tributaries as 
well as many protected rainforests. Projects in the Amazon primarily operate as run-of-the-river 
projects, meant to avoid the large flood areas of reservoir projects. However, in combination with 
the rainy and dry seasons, run-of-the-river projects mean there is high seasonal variability in 
water flow and power production for dammed rivers. 
The Brazilian Belo Monte dam on the Xingu River, a tributary of the Amazon, is slated to 
be the world’s fourth largest dam, with a capacity of over 11,000 MW once completed in 2019. 
First proposed in 1975 under the military dictatorship’s strategy of economic growth and 
national security, the plans for the dam have since been modified, ostensibly to incorporate 
environmental concerns and consultation with affected groups. Although 10 out 24 turbines are 
operational, its installation and operating licenses have been  suspended by federal courts several 
times due to environmental and social concerns in compensating local communities. Other large 
projects have been suspended as well: the license for the planned São Luiz dam in the Tapajos 
River was canceled by IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental agency, in August 2016. There are 
currently over 250 dams planned, under construction, or in operation in Brazil (Dams in 
Amazonia, 2018). 
Brazil expects to expand its hydropower production in the next ten years, although 
economic conditions have reduced energy demand. Projections from the Brazil 2024 Ten Year 
Energy Expansion Plan (Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia, PDE) project hydropower 
expansion to increase from 87 to 112 gigawatts (GW) by 2024 (PDE, 2015). However, the 2026 
PDE outlines a more conservative projection of 103 GW from hydroelectricity by 2026 (PDE, 
2016). This is due to a change in projections in the power mix of the country to include more 
solar and wind power, as well as acknowledging slower economic growth rates and difficulties in 
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obtaining and sustaining environmental licensing for new projects. Brazil faced an economic 
crisis in early 2015 that changed its projections for economic growth between the 2024 Ten Year 
Plan and the 2026 PDE. With eight quarters of negative growth, high unemployment, credit 
restrictions, and lack of investor confidence weakened domestic demand, retracting major sectors 
of the economy that use hydropower such as agriculture, industry, and services (Trading 
Economics, 2018). 
The 2026 PDE projects a 1.4% annual average growth rate for the first half of the decade, 
accelerating to 2.3% in the second half of the decade, presenting energy efficiency along with 
reduction in consumption across commercial, residential, and industrial sectors as accounting for 
the reduction throughout the decade (PDE, 2016). The PDE points out that demand for electricity 
will increase over time as less connected regions become electrified and commercial and 
residential development continues, even with stagnation in the economy. The table below shows 
the energy capacity projections for Brazil between 2014 and 2024. 
Brazil Energy Projections and Installed Capacity by Source, 2014-2024 
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                     Source: 2024 Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia (PDE) 
 
The inflexibility of hydropower dams in terms of siting is compounded by the 
inflexibility of adjusting to changing energy demand over a long project period, and demand 
forecasts consistently overestimate future needs (McCully, 2001). Although the Brazilian 
government has adjusted its projections for energy demand, it still may be overestimating the 
need for electricity, especially with a decreasing population growth rate currently comparable to 
the United States of around 0.8% annually (World Bank, 2016). Looking for smaller scale, more 
flexible sources of energy and energy storage may reduce the economic risk faced by the 
Brazilian government in these large projects. 
Ecuador 
Over the last few years, Ecuador has become a prime example of development in the 
hydroelectricity sector. With the highest concentration of rivers per square kilometer of any 
country in the world, it may seem natural that hydroelectric dams would become part of the 
developing landscape. However, the factors driving the construction of these dams are complex 
and include political relations, sustainability considerations, and long-term financial risks and 
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benefits of dam construction. 
In 2008, a new constitution was introduced by President Rafael Correa, placing emphasis 
on sustainability and indigenous rights (Gatehouse, 2017). Focusing on clean energy seemed like 
the perfect solution to boost the economy and create jobs, while also committing to more 
sustainable practices. A “Master Plan of Electrification” was created by the government in 2012, 
which would involve the building of 8 hydroelectric dams over the course of 9 years (Gatehouse, 
2017). 
 Alternative Energy Potential in Ecuador 
 
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016 
Hydropower remains the most viable source of renewable energy potential in Ecuador. 
Hydropower is the second largest energy source in the country, following oil, which in 2016  
accounted for 76% of the country’s energy consumption, while hydro accounted for 19% 
(Hellenic Shipping News, 2018). Thus, the government has placed most of the focus on 
hydropower projects, with a goal to have 90% of energy coming from hydro sources by 2017 (St. 
James, 2016). There is the potential for solar, wind, and other renewable energy sources, 
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however developing a grid in the mountainous landscape is difficult, so it has not been a focus. 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is located in the Eastern part of Africa and is considered one of the largest 
riparian countries of the river Nile occupying second place after Sudan. The population of the 
country was estimated to be 102 million with growth rate of 2.6 percent annually (Word Bank, 
2016). The topography of Ethiopia is very mountainous, posing extreme challenges to the 
development of the country’s infrastructure. Due to many political, social and economic 
vulnerabilities as well as climate change, Ethiopia is rendered in the least developed countries in 
the world (Swain, 2011). The Ethiopian economy depends mainly on rain fed agriculture with 
very limited infrastructure for industrial/ mass agriculture (Martens, 2011). Nevertheless, in the 
recent years, political stability has been increasing as the new Ethiopian government tries to 
catch up with the fast-developing world and meet its population’s needs. This new form of stable 
governance sets developing the nation’s infrastructure, economy, and agriculture among the first 
priorities with developing water resources at the heart of the economic development scheme. 
Thus, Ethiopia has begun to receive increased international attention and donor funding 
(Martens, 2011). 
Ethiopia has only been able to exploit 5 percent of its total surface water that comes from 
the Nile (Arsano and Tamrat, 2004). Around 4.7 percent of the utilized water is used in 
agriculture for irrigation (Arsano, 2007). Yet, this situation is shifting as the government plans to 
amplify the irrigation capacity using hydropower. The Nile as the major water source will hence 
play a substantial role. According to Ethiopian officials, there is a pressing need to dam the river 
Nile flow in Ethiopia and utilize the generated hydropower for large-scale irrigation (Arsano, 
2007). The Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) emphasizes on the intention to 
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significantly expand the hydropower capacity of the country over the next few decades mainly 
through the construction and completion of the Grand Renaissance dam. The construction of five 
hydropower dam projects has been initiated with the help of international funding, particularly 
from China (Martens, 2011). 
Egypt 
The western Saharan Desert constitutes the largest portion of the Egyptian territory. The 
people of Egypt settle along the narrow strip of land along the banks of the river Nile and the 
Delta. People live in about less than 6% of Egypt’s land area (OECD, 2004). The Nile in Egypt 
is the only source of water for drinking and irrigation. Recently, however, the country has been 
facing severe water scarcity and the situation is expected to exacerbate in the future. 
It is important to differentiate between two forms of water scarcity. Most of the African 
countries face economic water scarcity due to the underdeveloped infrastructure and the under-
use of their water resources. Egypt, on the other hand, is confronting physical water scarcity. The 
country has adequate resources to regulate the water of the river Nile but has minimal potential 
for any further utilization. According to the 2016 Water Stress Index Report, Egypt is categorized 
as a country facing chronic water scarcity. Due to Sudan not fully exploiting its share of water 
from the Nile in the past, Egypt had been withdrawing more than its legal share of water in order 
to meet its population demands. Relying on the overuse of the Nile water, the country has lately 
developed new irrigation projects, such as the Southern Valley Development Project which 
required the utilization of approximately 10 percent of Egypt’s share of water. Yet, with the 
changing hydro-politics and the need for economic development in both Ethiopia and Sudan, 
these projects are in question and there is a pressing need for alternative sources of energy. 
In order to face this chronic water shortage and due to the incapacity of hydropower 
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projects in Egypt, the government opted to resort to alternative sources of power to meet the 
population demands. Recently, Egypt inaugurated the first solar power plant to generate as much 
as 2 GW from the sun, curbing the country’s reliance on unsustainable sources of energy 
(Elwardany, 2018). Egypt is also looking at nuclear and wind power to generate electricity and 
light up its new cities. 
The Zambezi River Basin 
From its source in Northern Zambia, the nearly 1,600 mile-long Zambezi River flows 
through 6 countries (Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique) before 
emptying into the Indian Ocean. It is the fourth largest river in Africa and has a catchment basin 
area that is slightly less than half of the Nile’s. The Zambezi River basin also has one of the most 
variable climates in the world, which makes the basin system particularly susceptible to climate 
change effects. 
There are two large dams found along the river (the Kariba Dam and the Cohora Bassa 
Dam), as well as plans for building a third. The Kariba Dam, built in the 1950s, is on the border 
of Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Cohora Bassa Dam (built in the 1970s) is in Mozambique. 
They primarily provide power for Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. There is also a 
proposed 3rd dam, the Batoka Dam, to be built along the Zambia/Zimbabwe border. This dam has 
been proposed several times over the last three decades and has been met with much resistance. 
A few of the major reasons for this are the prominent Victoria Falls, just a short distance 
upstream from the proposed site as well as the effects the dam would have on whitewater rafting 
sites in Zambia. The tourism around these two sites are a source of livelihood for thousands of 
locals (Sanyanga, 2014). 
Hydroelectric dams along the Zambezi River are one of the major contributors to the 
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Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). However, the power production capability of dams on the 
Zambezi River is being threatened by a variety of factors. The main source of water for the 
Zambezi River is rainfall. This is troublesome for two main reasons. First, the Zambezi is located 
along the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which causes drastic dry and wet seasons.  
Secondly, climate change has further complicated consistent sources of water by changing 
rainfall patterns and making them more erratic. This has made cooperative water management 
along the Zambezi River Basin a necessity to meet the energy demands of its riparian countries 
and for the wider Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African 
Power Pool (SAPP). 
SAPP Installed Generation Capacity by Technology-2015 
 
   Source: SAPP, 2016 
 
Along the Zambezi River the three countries farthest downstream are home to the two 
currently operating large dams, and the 3rd proposed large dam. These countries are Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, and are the largest producers of electricity of the Zambezi riparian 
nations. 
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 Southern African Region Electricity Demand
 
  
Zambia 
Hydroelectric power is second largest energy source in Zambia, after wood fuel. Zambia 
borders 41% of the Zambezi River and is estimated to have 40% of the water resources in the 
SADC. Zambia has about 6,000 MW unexploited hydropower potential, with only around 2,200 
MW developed. There have been no major additions to Zambia’s generation capacity in almost 
three decades (Zambia Development Agency, 2014). However, that will change when the Bakota 
Gorge Dam is completed. This increased production capacity is much needed due to the positive 
economic growth Zambia has been experiencing in the recent past, which has already surpassed 
the 2014 installed capacity shown in figure above. 
Other than the untapped power capability of the Zambezi River, Zambia also has enough 
sunshine per year (2,000-3,000 hours of sunshine per year) to make solar power plants a viable 
and productive option. However, the initial cost of solar power plants is still too high for Zambia. 
As of yet, solar power has only been made possible in small projects through donor funding. If 
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the initial cost of solar power were to drop it could become a very productive alternative energy 
source, and would alleviate the pressure on the Zambezi River. 
                                     2014 Installed Production Capacity (in MWs) 
 
Source: Wishart, 2015 
  
Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe is currently facing an energy crisis brought on by aging power plants and 
deteriorating energy infrastructure. Figure 3 shows an installed energy capacity of almost 2000 
MW, and an actual energy output of less than half of the installed capacity. One major factor 
contributing to this energy crisis is the deterioration of the almost 70 year old Kariba Dam and a 
major drought that reduced the water levels in its reservoir. Zimbabwe and Zambia, through the 
Zambezi River Authority have plans for a rehabilitation project for the Kariba Dam. 
Additionally, Zimbabwe has already started a $171 million Kariba South Extension project to 
boost the productive capacity of the dam. 
Zimbabwe has been able to import power from Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, South Africa, and Zambia to make up for this downturn in actual power generation. 
However, Zimbabwe hopes to be able to meet its energy needs with the Batoka Gorge large dam 
project. 
      
 
23 
                                 Zimbabwe 2016 Power Generation (in MWs)
 
 
Zimbabwe also has a few other untapped sources of renewable energy. There is still much 
untapped hydroelectric potential along the Zambezi River, estimated at around 30 TWh per year. 
The nation has also started construction of two solar power plants that are estimated to have 
production capacity of 100 MW each (Business Sweden, 2016). 
Mozambique 
Mozambique is estimated to have a hydropower generation potential of 15,000 MW per 
year. Of that only 2,100W is currently installed. This leaves a large untapped potential that 
Mozambique can use to meet its current energy needs. However, power transmission has become 
a huge problem for the country. This is primarily due to the fact that Mozambique is a relatively 
large country with very dispersed settlement patterns. This makes the costs of installing power 
transference infrastructure prohibitive (Hivos, 2009). 
Most of the installed hydropower capacity in Mozambique comes from the Cohora Bassa 
Dam, which has an estimated generation potential of 2,000 MW. However, recently the water 
levels in the reservoir have been low, which has reduced the power generation capacity 
(Poindexter, 2016). Not only is this creating an energy crisis for the nation, but also affects the 
ability of the nation to earn financial capital as a regional energy exporter (primarily to South 
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Africa). 
Mozambique also has great potential for solar energy production. The country is 
estimated to have 1.49 GWh of solar energy generation potential, which is largely untapped 
(Hivos, 2009). 
Investment in Hydroelectric Dams 
 The financing of new dam projects has shifted from mostly public, state-led projects to 
increasingly complex public-private partnerships between international firms, export-import 
banks, and regional development institutions. International and regional development banks such 
as the World Bank no longer fund new infrastructure projects such as hydropower dams in all 
regions of the Global South, although its funds are still present in regions like southern Africa. 
Private sector and bilateral investment in dams has grown, particularly from countries like China, 
who are seeking to invest in infrastructure around the world. At the same time, the financial risks 
present in such considerable investments make some investors question the economic viability of 
large dam projects compared to other renewables. 
The Mekong River Basin 
In addition to investing infrastructure in other parts of the world, China has also invested 
in projects on the Mekong downstream via state-owned firms, such as Sinohydro and China 
Southern Power Grid Company Ltd, as investor or developer in around 21 hydropower projects 
in Laos and Cambodia (Han, 2017; Merme et al, 2013). Thai banks also have large investments 
in hydropower projects. Six commercial Thai banks are funding the Xayaburi Dam in Laos. The 
dam is being built by a Thai construction company and the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT) is contracted to purchase 95% of the dam’s electricity (International Rivers, 
2018). Although a smaller regional power than China, Thailand is also able to exert regional 
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economic influence on investment-hungry neighbors like Cambodia and Laos. 
Brazil 
Since the mid-2000s, most financing for hydroelectric dams in Brazil has come from the 
national development bank, Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES). The bank finances large projects such as the Belo Monte Dam for around 80% of the 
project costs, or approximately $11 billion USD (Bank Track, 2016). The remainder is financed 
by the Norte Energia consortium, which is primarily made up of national partners including state 
power company Electrobras, state pension funds, and private Brazilian construction firms. 
However, as of February 2017, the majority stakeholders in the consortium have expressed 
interest in selling their shares. Chinese utilities companies State Grid Corporation and China 
Three Gorges corporation have emerged as possible buyers of the shares (Reuters, 2018). The 
recent economic recession in 2015 has increased macroeconomic instability, especially putting 
pressure on state-managed pension funds (combined with increasing costs of the project). 
Skeptics of the financial viability of large dam projects say that in cases like Belo Monte, a lack 
of private investment signals that there is a high risk on returns that only the government is able 
to absorb (Bank Track, 2016). Other Brazilian dams have more diverse mixes of private and 
public investors, but the size of a project like Belo Monte represents a not only a large proportion 
of energy production for the country, but also high proportion of its debt balance sheet, which 
would only increase with scheduling delays and increased costs to address federal court rulings. 
Other aspects of power production in Brazil are financed by foreign private investment. 
In particular, Chinese companies are emerging as investors and owners of power transmission 
lines and smaller dam projects. In September 2017, the State Grid Corporation, owned by China, 
purchased the remaining shares of Brazilian CPFL Energia and now owns 100% of the company. 
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CPFL has a 13% market share of power distribution in Brazil (China Daily, 2017). The State 
Grid Corporation operates around 7,000 kilometers of lines in Brazil, with over 6,000 additional 
kilometers under construction. Chinese investment in Brazil reached a recent high of nearly $25 
billion in 2017,  primarily in energy, oil , and gas, though the construction and services industries 
are emerging as new markets (Biller, 2018). Chinese firms also seize other opportunities, making 
acquisitions from American firms exiting Brazil. In 2016, China Three Gorges Corporation 
acquired ownership of 10 hydropower facilities from a North Carolina firm, a total of around 
2,000 MW of power (Duke Energy, 2016). Chinese investment in Brazil is part of its One Belt, 
One Road infrastructure investment plan of one trillion dollars globally, making China a major 
player in foreign direct investment alongside other power like the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union. In general, Chinese investment in Brazil is perceived as an opportunity for 
renewed growth of the stagnant economy, but concerns about dependence on foreign investors 
and their encroachment into some sectors formerly dominated by the government make some 
wary. 
Although historically international and regional development banks have helped finance 
large dam projects in Brazil, direct financing for hydroelectric infrastructure projects slowed 
substantially after 1980. The World Bank committed over $750 million USD to hydroelectric 
energy projects, mostly in the 1960s and 1970s (World Bank Project Database, 2018). Currently, 
it does not fund any dam projects in Brazil. However, in 2009 the Bank made a $1.3 billion 
dollar loan for Sustainable Environmental Management Development Policy improvements. The 
main goals of the loan were to strengthen the government of Brazil’s environmental management 
system by integrating environmental concerns into social and economic policies to achieve 
sustainable development goals. The objectives included improving the management of 
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agricultural, forest, and water resources, and promoting renewable energy by establishing climate 
change planning as a national priority (World Bank, 2009). Though the results were disputed by 
the Brazilian government, the World Bank project performance report concluded that there was 
“little if any discernible improvement in BNDES’s environmental and social system” and cited 
the Belo Monte dam as an “emblematic example of the continuing weaknesses in BNDES’s 
environmental and social management system” (IEG, 2015). Overall, the Bank criticized 
BNDES for its lack of guidelines for hydropower planning and not meaningfully integrating 
environmental and social principles into its financial investments. Some critics consider the 
World Bank’s Development Policy Loans a “softer and gentler form of conditionality” from the 
Structural Adjustment Loans rampant in Latin America in the 1980s (McElhinny, 2009). 
The regional Latin American/Caribbean Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) does 
not fund any new energy projects in Brazil, but recently funded the rehabilitation of the Furnas 
Luiz Hydroelectric project near Sao Paulo for $150  million USD (IADB, 2018). In its energy 
sector lending, the IADB finances wind, solar, and biofuel projects, as well as retrofitting 
hydroelectric facilities for efficiency and environmental and social standards. It seems apparent 
that the IADB prioritizes efficiency improvements, diversity of energy sources, and capacity 
building of energy institutions. Despite its historical contributions to dam infrastructure projects, 
the IADB is distancing itself from new hydropower projects, at least in Brazil. 
Despite its strong financial commitment to large projects like the Belo Monte Dam, 
BNDES is looking to diversify from hydroelectric energy sources:   
The Brazilian energy grid, although renewable, has more than 60% of its generation from 
hydroelectric sources, which tends to be increasingly exposed to the effects of climate change 
and drought periods. Given this context, the new partnership seeks to promote alternative energy, 
supporting the diversification of the grid and increasing the security of the system in the future, 
in order to ensure the supply for all the economic sectors (BNDES, 2018). 
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As recently as January 2018, the Ministry of Mines and Energy announced the Brazilian 
government’s  intention to shift away from mega dam construction, stating that the costs 
associated with the projects were “much less competitive than previous assessments” (Watts, 
2018). 
The shift away from international and regional development bank funding for dam 
projects in Brazil, as well as economic pressures on state financed projects, means that Brazil has 
two main options--secure private finance or diversify its energy portfolio to include alternative 
renewables like wind and solar. From its financial ties to China and its public commitment to 
increasing wind and solar projects, there is evidence that it is doing both, even as it pushes 
forward the completion of the final stages of the Belo Monte dam by 2019. 
Ecuador 
In order to finance expensive hydro-dam construction projects, the government of 
Ecuador has relied heavily on loans from China. Although financial transparency is an issue, 
estimates for the country’s debt to China are estimated to be at least $15 billion (Pskowski, 
2016). For the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, Ecuador requested over $1.5 billion from China in order 
to finance 85% of the project, the largest amount loaned by China to any country in the region 
(Ortiz, 2010). Although the dam is estimated to supply 35% of the energy needs for the country, 
the potential environmental impact and the amount of interest owed to China have been widely 
criticized (Ortiz, 2010). The Ecuadorian government has not seen the expense associated with the 
construction of dams as an issue in comparison with the perceived benefits of hydroelectricity. 
Thus, the opportunity to receive funding from China for a shift to renewable energy that is in line 
with the commitments made in their constitution has driven the continued construction of 
hydroelectric dams. 
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The Nile River Basin: Ethiopia 
China is considered a key foreign actor that influences land use and water management in 
the Nile Basin. The Chinese interest in Africa is derived from obtaining energy sources and raw 
materials for its rapidly growing industries and economic development. The rapidly increasing 
growth in foreign trade between China and Africa since the 1990s has stunned the Western 
hemisphere of the globe (Schüller and Asche, 2008). The reasons behind the Chinese 
involvement in Ethiopia might not be as clear. However, China is aware of the increasing 
significance of Ethiopia’s geopolitical role in the horn of Africa and the Nile Basin upstream 
countries. The bilateral relations between China and Ethiopia which include a zero tariff for 
Ethiopian goods, debt cancellation, and joint infrastructure projects, have made them unique 
partners (Arsano, 2007). 
China does not hesitate to step in and finance projects that might have uncertain long-
term impacts when Western donors shy away from them. While China steps in with full support, 
other donors are still often focusing more on potential long-term negative environmental impacts 
of development rather than welfare impacts for poor upstream populations (Schüller and Asche, 
2008). 
The highlight of the Chinese financial support in Africa is that it is not related or linked to 
any particular objectives or standards that have to be met by the beneficiary country (Arsano, 
2007). Unlike Western donors, China is less stringent on political reforms or economic 
obligations from their African counterparts, this makes their funds more accessible and much 
faster to obtain than Western donors. It also serves the interests of the African political elite in 
power and fosters the relationship with them to move on quickly with the hydropower projects. 
Therefore, the emerging hand of China represents a powerful alternative to “traditional” Western 
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donors. 
The Zambezi River Basin 
Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been a large recipient of international aid for 
development. This is still the case as large international organizations such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations have continued to fund dam projects in the region and along the Zambezi 
River. In recent years, the African Development Bank has also become a large supporter of dam 
projects on the Zambezi. Dam projects in Africa are a large part of their New Deal on Energy for 
Africa, which aims to achieve universal electrification for all of Africa by 2025 (African 
Development Bank, 2016). 
Developing economies (particularly China),In order to meet its growing population, 
growing middle class, and the need for raw resources, have interjected themselves in many of the 
Southern African nations’ economies. “New development finance is pouring into the Zambezi 
Basin from China, BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] and transnational 
corporations” (Pearce, 2013). In the case of Zambia, the economic boost given by China has 
increased its capability to exploit its water resources. This is particularly troubling for Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique, who other than Zambia have the largest share of the Zambezi River. 
Trends, Drivers, and Constraints: Selected Cases 
Although riparian countries in each of our cases desire economic growth and face 
growing or changing energy demand, each case also faces unique challenges. Some riparians 
struggle for control over water resources between the upstream and downstream sections of the 
river, and must make way for cooperation or conflict among regional riparian powers. In other 
instances, large hydroelectric projects are perceived as a valuable source of renewable energy, 
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while other riparians begin to question the political, financial, and environmental risks involved 
in taking on new projects. 
The Mekong River Basin: hydro hegemony 
Power dynamics between upstream and downstream countries of the Mekong River 
Basin shape development in the region, but there are also opportunities for cooperation, 
including the export of electricity to neighboring countries. In the context of water resources of 
the Mekong River Basin, China serves as an upstream ‘hydro hegemon’ that can control the flow 
of the river, often via hydroelectric dam projects to generate electricity domestically. ‘Hydro 
hegemony’ refers to the power asymmetry between China and downstream neighbors Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam because of its water resources--in addition to containing the 
headwaters of the Mekong, the Tibetan plateau gives it abundant freshwater reserves (Han, 
2017). These water resources can be manipulated to exercise power over downstream countries, 
with China able to control dry and rainy season flows of the river. Currently, there are six 
mainstream dams in China on the Lancang/Mekong River. According to Han, China “refused to 
become a full member of the commission due to fear of being subjected to MRC provisions on 
aquatic environmental issues and restrictions on dam building” (Han, 20`7). Despite expanding 
its solar and wind capacity, in the short term it is likely that China will continues its hydropower 
expansion. 
There have been opportunities for both regional contestation and cooperation. In 1992, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created the Greater Mekong Subregion, an economic 
cooperation program that later included a “Roadmap for Expanded Energy Cooperation” which 
would facilitate power trade among states (Middleton & Allouche, 2016). Trade with more 
affluent countries like Thailand and Vietnam meet their growing electricity demand, while 
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countries like Laos could earn revenue by exporting power. According to the Mekong Policy 
Project at the Stimson Center, countries in the basin like China, Myanmar, and perhaps 
Cambodia, will become energy exporters in the near future as they expand domestic capacity 
(Cronin & Weatherby, 2015). This shift from importers to exporters may foil Laos’ plans for 
earning revenue from its neighbors, and may signal a slowdown in the rate of energy demand 
growth in the region. 
Brazil: Transitioning away from mega dams 
Unlike smaller developing economies like Ecuador or Laos, which seek to expand their 
production of hydropower, Brazil is slowing its growth in hydropower. Brazil expects to increase 
the proportion of wind and solar energy generation while slowing the relative growth in large 
hydropower capacity. In particular, on-shore wind is appealing as a form of renewable energy 
due to abundant wind resources in the northeastern part of the country. According to the 2026 
PDE, Brazil aims to increase its installed capacity of wind from 10,000 MW to 28,500 MW by 
2016. On a smaller scale, solar capacity would be increased from less than 100 MW to 9,660, or 
around 1,000 MW per year (PDE, 2016). Brazil has some infrastructure to support alternative 
renewables, but still faces barriers against a larger-scale rollout. At one point the Brazilian 
government supported energy auctions with long-term Power Purchase Agreements, had access 
to low-cost financing from BNDES, and was working on state level tax incentives for solar PV 
(Cuff, 2018). Energy sector officials currently believe that solar currently has uncompetitive 
deployment costs, though rates are falling in Brazil very quickly (PDE, 2026). While wind and 
solar capacity are increasing quickly, the amount of hydropower capacity will increase over the 
next decade at a much slower rate. 
  Climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts, along with the increased investment 
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potential, explain Brazil’s shift towards solar and wind. The 2015 Paris Agreement from the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change outlines Brazil’s Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. According to Brazil’s 
NDC, “Brazil intends to commit to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels 
in 2025” (Brazil INDC, 2015). In addition, Brazil committed to adaptation measures such as 
more renewables in its energy mix, “expanding the use of renewable energy sources other than 
hydropower in the total energy mix to between 28% and 33% by 2030” and “increasing the share 
of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply to at least 23% by 2030, including by 
raising the share of wind, biomass and solar” (ibid). According to these commitments, relative to 
other renewables, the proportion of hydropower in the energy mix will stay stagnant or shrink in 
the coming years. This matches with 2024 PDE projections, where hydroelectric power shrinks 
from 68% to 57% of installed capacity over ten years, and the proportion of wind and solar 
installed capacity increases almost threefold. Rivers with seasonal flow like the Amazon, with 
reduced dry season energy production, as well as greenhouse gas emissions from dam reservoirs, 
may explain why large hydropower projects are not considered part of Brazil’s renewable energy 
commitments with the UNFCCC.   
Internal political factors contribute to some of the public shift away from large dams. 
Civil society, primarily indigenous groups and environmental activists, have used public protest 
to halt or stall dam construction by physically occupying dam sites. International actors have also 
been involved--Hollywood director James Cameron of the film Avatar became a spokesperson 
on behalf of the NGO Amazon Watch, supporting the Xingu indigenous group and speaking out 
against the dam (Phillips, 2010). Federal court cases and rulings from the environmental agency 
IBAMA have also delayed dam projects. In September 2015, IBAMA withheld the operating 
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license from the Belo Monte dam consortium Norte Energia until it completed mitigation 
projects such as sanitation systems and housing for displaced communities (Douglas, 2015). In 
January 2016, a federal court again suspended Norte Energia’s operating license for failing to 
adequately provide for the indigenous groups affected by the dam construction (Watts, 2016). 
However, the license suspensions often delay operations only temporarily. In a holdover from the 
military dictatorship, the Brazilian government can implement a security suspension (suspensão 
de segurança), which allows a judicial decision to be overturned that causes ‘grave damage to the 
public economy’ or national security (Fearnside, 2017). Nearly every dam project would fall into 
this classification.   
Massive corruption scandals such as the ongoing Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal, which 
began in 2014, have had transnational and implications across many sectors of the economy and 
political sphere, touching state run oil company Petrobras, major construction company 
Odebrecht, former presidents Lula da Silva and Rousseff, current president Michel Temer, and 
many current and former public officials at the local, state, and national level. Odebrecht, whose 
portfolio includes 85 hydropower plants and is one of the construction contractors of the Belo 
Monte dam, pled guilty to giving bribes in exchange for government contracts and agreed in late 
2016 to pay up to $2.6 billion dollars in fines (Watts, 2017).These scandals have increased public 
scrutiny of the dam industry, the construction sector, and politicians in general. Public 
participation and input on dam projects may include more imperfect and cursory consultation 
than the transparent negotiations suggested by the World Commission on Dams, but activists in 
Brazilian civil society are working to hold the government accountable, both on corruption and 
on compensation for dam-affected communities. 
While climate change considerations and increased public scrutiny of corruption in the 
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construction sector may have shifted discussions of Brazil’s energy portfolio, the economic 
recession in 2015 substantially decreased energy demand, halting or stopping new projects in 
their tracks.The economic recession had implications for solar and wind expansion as well. In 
August 2017, the Brazilian government canceled 25 wind and solar projects contracted to 
companies in the face of slump (Reuters, 2017). The firms cited reduced credit availability and 
slow recovery in the construction sector as reasons to beg off the deal. The temporary nature of 
the recession could mean that if energy demand increases, Brazil may again change course on its 
position on large dams and resume delayed or halted projects, such as dams in the Tapajos Basin. 
Ecuador: The beginning of new dam construction 
In Ecuador, as in many countries in the Amazon Basin with the exception of Brazil, the 
construction of dams and the shift to hydropower is in the early stages. Although the 
government’s emphasis on renewable energy is fairly recent, with a particular focus on 
hydropower due to the untapped potential in the area, the development has happened quickly. 
Ten years ago, the country that was highly dependent on fossil fuels, which not only represented 
much of the power generation within Ecuador but also made up nearly half of all exports (IHA 
2017). With a new constitution signed in 2008, which focuses on indigenous environmental 
rights and clean energy, the government has encouraged a transition alternative energy, with an 
ambitious goal of 90% of electricity sourced from hydro (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016; IHA 
2017). In pursuit of this goal, 8 hydroelectric dam projects have been constructed or planned 
over the last 3 years, the largest of which is Coca Codo Sinclair, which cost $2.2 billion USD and 
is generating almost 1,500 MW of power (Energia16, 2015). With more projects in the works, 
and little focus on other forms of renewable energy, the construction of dams in Ecuador is 
expected to continue at a rapid pace. 
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The Nile Basin: Changing Hydro-politics 
Even though Egypt has been able to preserve its hydro-political hegemonic status for 
decades, this position of power within the Basin is now being under scrutiny. Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed the new 
cooperation framework agreement (based on IWRM) in 2010 (Elwardany, 2016). Such a step 
shepherds a clear shift in the hydro-hegemonic dynamics in the basin. Since upstream countries 
are having more political and social stabilities, they are poised to exploit more water from the 
Nile for their own economic benefit and lean towards the formation of coalitions to dominate the 
hydro-politics. The creation of stronger multilateral ties between upstream riparians in the Nile 
can either set a conflict between upstream and downstream countries in motion or open the door 
for diplomacy and cooperation to resolve issues amicably. 
The Zambezi River Basin: Out with the old, in with the new 
The Zambezi River has a few unique trends/events that are not shared with the other river 
basins in this report. First, the Kariba Dam, which borders Zambia and Zimbabwe, is 
deteriorating and is in need of a rehabilitation project to avert a catastrophic collapse. Second, 
since international organizations are still willing to provide funding for dams along the Zambezi 
there has been no move to switch to internal or regional funding for dam projects. 
The Kariba Dam was built over 50 years ago and in that time has been a major source of 
power for the whole Southern African region. However, in recent years the dam has begun to 
deteriorate. This has reduced the energy generation capability of the dam and unless 
rehabilitated, the dam could collapse, endangering millions of local inhabitants. The Kariba Dam 
rehabilitation project, with estimated costs of almost $300 million, is also an example of the 
availability of funding from outside sources. The table below shows the major funders for this 
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project (Wishart, 2015). 
 Financing for the Kariba Dam Rehabilitation Project 
 
Source: Wishart, 2015 
Transboundary Governance and Water Management 
In order to achieve development outcomes that are sustainable and equitable, the 
management of water resources across national and regional boundaries is essential across many 
sectors, including hydropower development on rivers that cross borders. Integrated Water 
Resources Management is an international framework based on principles of social equity, 
economic efficiency, and ecological sustainability. IWRM is “the process that promotes the 
coordinated development and management of water, land, and related resources in order to 
maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (Global Water Partnership, 2011). Many 
regional water management organizations use aspects of this framework in their work. Although 
some dams are contracted on an individual project basis, dam development is closely intertwined 
with the regional management of water resources because of the potential basin-wide impacts. 
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Despite the unique social, political, and economic factors driving or constraining dam 
construction in individual countries, the connectivity of rivers in basins between riparians means 
that issues and benefits cross political boundaries and need to be dealt with cooperatively.   
Mekong River Basin 
As a result of upstream dams in China  as well as other mainstream development on the 
river, the major transboundary issues of the Mekong Basin are around the food-water-energy 
security nexus. As mentioned previously, millions of people rely on the basin for livelihoods 
from fisheries and floodplain agriculture. At the same time, demand for energy is increasing as 
populations grow and rural areas become electrified. Through transboundary water management 
organizations and regional economic cooperation programs, riparians in the Mekong are working 
to balance the economic investment that hydroelectric dams can bring to their countries with the 
basinwide effects on the ecosystem and localized effects on river communities. 
On the Mekong River, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) serves as an interstate 
organization that promotes an equitable sharing of benefits and risks among all countries of the 
basin using research, monitoring, and modeling to manage water resources. One of its primary 
objectives is to “promote optimal and well‐balanced development of the Basin while ensuring 
the equitable sharing of benefits among all users of Basin water and related resources” (MRC, 
2018). The agreement establishing the organization, the Mekong Agreement, was created in 1995 
by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 1995 agreement included procedures for 
Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement as well as articles on “reasonable and equitable 
use” and “prevention and cessation of harmful effects”, all while acknowledging the sovereignty 
of the member states (Chapter III Articles 4, 5, 7, 1995). The MRC operates under a dozen 
thematic areas involving development and management of the basin, including sustainable 
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hydropower. Among other international river management organizations, the MRC is one of the 
more established, and leads the way in research. 
As an international organization, the MRC can reduce transaction costs in negotiations 
involving conflict of water resources between states by being a platform to facilitate consensus 
and cooperation among member states. The organization pools technical resources, knowledge, 
and measurement and evaluation on river projects in order to sustainably develop the region. 
However, the MRC faces limitations, mainly due to the Lower Mekong Basin’s proximity to 
China and the organization’s limited mandate. China is not a member of the MRC, but as an 
upstream country, can substantially impact dam development and water resources that have 
negative impacts on the downstream parts of the Mekong. In addition to China’s economic and 
political power in the region is the Commission’s lack of legally binding authority, which 
prevents the MRC from making regulations, or from member states unilaterally building dams 
despite opposition from other members. 
Despite its limitations, the MRC provides an important role in influencing policy and 
support regional cooperation. The Commission provides research and sustainability assessments 
that go more in-depth than the environmental impact assessments of dam developers. With its 
research and evaluation capabilities, as well as its cooperative planning efforts with member 
states, the MRC has legitimacy as an evidence-based institution that advocacy organizations and 
activists may not have. However, because it is funded by Western donors, the MRC may not be 
considered legitimate in the lower Mekong by a powerful neighbor--China. 
In the MRC, China and Myanmar are not full members, but serve as upstream “Dialogue 
Partners,” essentially observers. The working relationships between these two countries and the 
MRC primarily involve data sharing of river flow and rainfall data (MRC-Upstream Partners, 
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2018). China has its own transboundary organization, the newly formed Lancang-Mekong 
Cooperation Mechanism. The LMCM’s development goals are to synergize China’s 
infrastructure development strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, with the ASEAN Community 
Vision for 2025 (China Daily, 2018). Established in January 2018, the mechanism’s main 
principles are consensus, mutual consultation and coordination, and respect for international and 
domestic laws. Though mentioning water security, flood and drought management, and 
technological cooperation of water resource management, the plan of action does not mention 
dam development specifically.   
The MRC’s lack of regulatory and veto power means that the MRC does not have direct 
control the development on the Mekong. Among the MRC member states, Cambodia and Laos in 
particular have pursued dam projects, primarily to produce power for export. Critics of the MRC 
have questioned why the commission was unable to resolve disputes involving dam construction. 
In particular, the public participation processes for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams were 
seen as failures of the MRC’s Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement. In 
2011, the government of Laos announced its proposal for the Xayaburi Dam. Although the 
downstream countries of Cambodia and Vietnam expressed concern over the dam’s impacts, 
Laos began construction of the dam a year and a half later. This “had a serious corrosive effect 
on regional trust” of the notification and consultation process and damaged the MRC’s 
credibility (Cronin & Weatherby, 2015). 
Many of MRC’s limitations as a regional organization are not unique to the management 
of water resources, but rather are a function of being a transnational organization. Without 
enforcement mechanisms or regulatory power, the principle of state sovereignty privileges 
national interests, potentially over regional impacts.   
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The MRC is funded through member country contributions and development partners 
such as the European Union, World Bank, Japan, and the United States. In 2012, over 90% of 
MRC’s funding came from external donors (Gerlak & Haefner, 2017). Currently, the MRC is 
undergoing a transition to “streamline” the organization to become entirely funded by member 
countries gradually by 2030. On the one hand, the MRC would become a financially independent 
regional organization, no longer reliant on resources from donor countries.  However, this 
transition also means the organization would trim its budget by two-thirds in the same time 
period, which would substantially limit the scope of work the organization could achieve (MRC 
Strategic Plan, 2016-2020). The restructuring, termed ‘riparianization,’ decentralizes and 
localizes the staffing, budgeting, and programmatic functions of the organization. This comes 
from calls for reform, “pressure from donor community to be more self-sufficient,” and 
withdrawal of donors due to rapid development of dams on the river (Gerlak & Haefner, 2017). 
While the MRC is limited as a regional organization in its capacity to enforce the 
behavior of its member states, it provides definite and clear advice on dam development in the 
basin by specifically highlighting sustainable hydropower as one of its thematic areas. In 
contrast, other transboundary water management organizations discuss water security more 
generally, without mention of dams. The restructuring of the MRC may decrease the resources it 
has available to provide technical support through research and impact assessments, as 
contributions from member states are dependent on their growth prospects.   
The Lower Mekong Basin’s proximity to China, and China’s growth in the region, has 
already altered the relationship between the member states and China. It is likely through 
development of projects on the Mekong River, in addition to its investments in the region, that 
China will gain more influence over the Mekong in the name of enhanced regional cooperation. 
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Amazon Basin 
The Amazon River Basin, stretching across Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, 
Suriname, Guyana, and Venezuela, is the largest river basin in the world (Braga et. al, 2011). The 
basin contains more than 150 dams, with many more planned or under construction (Fraser 
2015). 
 ACTO was formed as part of an amendment to the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, which 
was signed by all 8 Amazon Basin countries in 1978, in an effort to ensure sustainable 
development practices throughout the basin (Braga et. al, 2011). In 1998, when ACTO was 
created, the countries began a more structured dialogue about sustainability, water management, 
and other regional development plans (Braga et. al, 2011). The organization has not focused on 
dams specifically, but recent projects, such as the GEF Amazon Project are centered on 
identifying issues in each country and establishing a framework for Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) (ACTO 2016). Climate change is seen as an important consideration in 
creating a cooperative plan of action, and a cross-border diagnostic analysis (TDA) has been 
conducted in each country to analyze climate vulnerability and how this relates to IWRM (GEF, 
2018). Through this TDA, ACTO was able to identify 10 priority cross-border issues to be 
addressed by the Strategic Action Plan (ACTO 2016). These transboundary problems included 
loss of biodiversity, deforestation, erosion/sedimentation, land use change, extreme 
hydroclimatic events, creating an integrated regional information platform, strengthening 
scientific knowledge, regional and cultural education, water pollution, and regional/institutional 
frameworks (GEF 2017). The concept of the project was approved in November 2017, but the 
project has not yet been approved for implementation (ACTO, 2018). 
Although ACTO and the ongoing GEF project does not focus on hydroelectric dams in 
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their research, it is clear that the many dams being built on the Amazon Basin have had and will 
continue to have an effect on many of the transboundary issues the GEF project aims to address. 
The GEF project does include hydropower as part of one of their outputs for the project, as 
meeting Sustainable Development Goals for each country is one of their objectives. One output 
of their Strategic Action Plan is inter-ministerial and expert dialogue roundtables, which will be 
focused on creating resilient infrastructure and hydropower as a potential source of sustainable 
energy, in order to address SDG 9, which entails building resilient infrastructure and promoting 
sustainable industrialization (GEF, 2017). Since these roundtables have yet to be implemented, 
it’s not clear what plans will be made or agreed upon in regard to hydropower dams, but since 
hydroelectricity is the largest and cheapest form of energy in the Amazon (Fraser, 2015), it seems 
likely that dams will be viewed as a positive way to increase renewable energy, as this has 
generally been the consensus of national governments. At this time, there is not a transboundary 
organization that has created guidelines, agreements, or exercised control over dam building in 
the Amazon Basin, but there is potential for ACTO to include hydroelectric dams in its analysis 
of the environmental, social, and political aspects of Integrated Water Resource Management. 
Nile Basin 
The river Nile is the longest river in the world extending over 6,670 km in Africa. The 
Nile goes through 11 different countries. It has three main sources: Lake Victoria, the largest 
freshwater lakes in the world, from which the White Nile originates; the Blue Nile; and the 
Atbara River, both are derived in Ethiopia. The upstream countries are: Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. There are three 
downstream countries: Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan (World Bank, 2000). 
The case of the river Nile is especially interesting in terms of runoff management and the 
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transboundary relations between the riparian countries. In most of the river basins, upstream 
countries are able to control the runoff discharge as they have the superior geographical location, 
like the case of China in the Mekong river basin. For the case of the Nile, however, the riparian 
countries have a different hydropolitical configuration. The runoff is mostly controlled by the 
downstream countries, especially the most downstream country of Egypt. This case makes it very 
interesting to study the river Nile basin water management between its riparian countries. 
From the cases of water management between riparian countries, we often see that conflict and 
cooperation can coexist. The dichotomy of black vs white does not really control the 
hydropolitical situation of riparian countries due to the presence of a lot of grey area that factors 
into the relationships. Collective problems are generally easier to address than problems related 
to the upstream-downstream relation, as all riparians seem to recognize the urgency related to 
these sorts of problems. The Nile river has always been a source of political tension and high 
intensity conflict between the countries that have most runoff  from the river i.e. Egypt, Sudan, 
South Sudan and Ethiopia. 
The two most powerful riparian countries in the river basin, Egypt and Ethiopia, are 
facing dynamic changes ranging from socioeconomic changes, such as population growths and 
increasing poverty, to environmental changes, such as climate change and water insecurity. These 
changes profoundly affect the bilateral relationships between both countries. The Ethiopian 
Grand Renaissance dam has been met with strong resistance by the Egyptian government. Egypt 
claims that the dam will shrink the size of the runoff quantity in the Nile and will have 
devastating effects on agriculture especially during the first three years of filling the dam’s 
reservoir. 
 The following table summarizes the socioeconomic and water-use related figures on 
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Egypt and Ethiopia. The table highlights the major difference between economic productivity in 
both countries in terms of GDP even though both countries have fairly similar demographic and 
geographic characteristics. 
 
The Nile Basin Initiative: 
Since 1999, comprehensive efforts have been made toward the development of a new 
Nile Basin regime called the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The NBI is a partnership initiated and 
run by the riparian states of the Nile River through the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of 
the Nile Basin states (NBI 2010). All riparian countries of the Nile Basin are represented in the 
NBI, except for Eritrea, which has only an observer role. The objectives of the NBI aim at 
developing a Nile Basin water resources management system that ensures peace and security for 
all the people of the riparian countries (NBI, 2010). They also aim at fostering cooperation and 
joint action between all riparians, seeking win-win gains with an overarching goal to eradicate 
poverty and promote economic prosperity basin wide. According to the NBI, all the program 
results shall move from planning to action in a timely and efficient fashion to ensure immediate 
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results for the peoples of the riparians (2010). 
Zambezi River Basin 
The first model for cooperative water management and dam building along the Zambezi 
River was created in the 1950’s under British colonial rule. Members of the British 
Commonwealth, some self-governed and some under direct British rule, came together to build 
the Kariba Dam along the borders of Zambia and Zimbabwe (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016). This early 
dam was seen as essential by the colonial ruling elite for mining, agriculture, industry, and the 
development of urban center. To meet these needs, the British built infrastructure that connected 
much of the SADC (the most important of which was South Africa) and set up a system of 
electricity transference that is still in place today, much of which has been upgraded in recent 
years (Soderbaum, 2015).  
 After the 6 riparian countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and 
Botswana) gained independence the river resources were utilized mostly along national 
boundaries in order to meet the growing needs of the fledgling nations. An outside expert on 
integrated water resource management sees it the following way: 
 
Each riparian state monitors, assesses, plans, develops, conserves and protects the 
Zambezi River resources within its own territory. The utilization of the water resources is 
done at the country level with little consultation and co-operation among riparian states. 
This situation is not conducive to the effective management of shared waters since each 
of the countries uses different standards. . . . The Zambezi River basin represents an arena 
of different national interest in which the various riparian states are developing diverging 
policies and plans that are usually not compatible. Upstream/downstream users are often 
not keen to consider the problems of each other (Breslin, 2002) 
 
 This style of water resource management where each nation focused on their part of the 
river clearly had some problems. This kind of state-centered water management often results in 
environmental degradation, resource waste, and unrealized potential. This competitive 
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mismanagement led to underutilized potential and is one major reason the riparian nations came 
together and signed an agreement to implement the action plan for the Environmentally Sound 
Management of the Common Zambezi River System (ZACPLAN). The ZACPLAN agreement 
was the first attempt to see the river as an international body of water as opposed to a river 
comprised of different sections that were managed according to national interest.  However, the 
ZACPLAN was only an agreement between member states to implement environmentally sound 
water resources management. It was shown to be largely ineffective because it lacked any legal 
or institutional framework (Soderbaum, 2015). This came seventeen years after the signing of 
ZACPLAN, when an agreement was signed to establish the Zambezi Watercourse Commission 
(ZAMCOM). The ZAMCOM is a regional instrument mandated to lead and coordinate 
international water resources management in the Zambezi River Basin. The agreement was 
ratified in 2011, which lead to the establishment of ZAMCOM as the legal institution for 
coordinating international water resource management in the Zambezi River Basin. It also serves 
as a framework for promoting the equitable utilization, efficient management, and sustainable 
development of the water resources (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016).  As stated in the ZAMCOM 
website, the major factors leading to the agreement and the key areas of interest for the 
commission are: 
● The scarcity and the value of water resources in the southern African region and 
the need to provide the people in the region with access to sufficient and safe 
water supplies; 
● The significance of the Zambezi Watercourse as a major water source in the 
region, as well as the need to conserve, protect and sustainably utilize its 
resources; 
● The commitment to the realization of the principles of equitable and reasonable 
utilization as well as the efficient management and sustainable development and 
management of the basin’s water resources; 
● The desire to extend and consolidate existing relations of good neighbourliness 
and cooperation amongst the Zambezi Riparian States on the basis of existing 
international water instruments. 
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Not only did the ZACPLAN contribute to the ZAMCOM Commission, but it also contributed to 
water management agreements for the wider South African region. In 1995 the 15 member states 
of the SADC enacted the Protocols on Shared Water Policy, which were later revised in 2000. 
These protocols signify the first cooperative action by the member states of the SADC to 
regulate and enforce shared water resource management in the whole Southern African Region.  
An excerpt from the protocols explains it in the following way: 
. . . unity and coherence of each shared watercourse and in accordance with this principle, 
undertake to harmonize the water uses in the shared watercourse and to ensure that all 
necessary interventions are consistent with the sustainable development of all 
Watercourse States and observe the objectives of regional integration and harmonization 
of their socio-economic policies and plans (SADC 2000).   
             
The protocols were not only an agreement on the use of shared watercourses, but also set up 
institutions and a legal framework. One major function of the institutions and legal framework 
was to act as a mediator and forum for any disputes that may arise from water resource 
management.  
 Of the six riparian countries, Zambia plays a key role in any cooperative management 
scheme. Zambia has 41% of the Zambezi River Basin, Zimbabwe has 19%, Mozambique and 
Angola has 11%, and Botswana has 6% (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016). Zambia and Zimbabwe having 
60% of the Zambezi River Basin within their countries has led to these two countries having a 
majority of the hydroelectric dams. The governments of these two countries have created the 
Zambezi River Authority (ZRA), a semi-governmental corporation that owns and operates a 
large number of dams on the river. The ZRA owns and operates the Kariba Dam and will do the 
same for the proposed Batoka Gorge Dam. Owning and operating two of the largest dams on the 
river has made the ZRA a big player in water management on the Zambezi River, as well as a 
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power supplier for the SADC.  
 More recently, the World Bank has initiated the Zambezi River Basin Program. This 
program was designed to respond to Southern Africa’s development needs. The $2 billion 
program, financed by the World Bank, is aimed at facilitating dialogue between riparian 
countries and to drive development of water sources for sustainable growth. The program also 
includes a long-term partnership between ZAMCOM and the ZRA to empower regional bodies 
with institutional mechanisms and information platforms to better manage shared water 
resources and advance high-priority infrastructure investments (Hoel, 2015). 
Analysis & Conclusion 
Some regions are experiencing a slowdown in hydro dam construction, while others are just 
getting started. 
● Internal politics and economy: Brazil, Ethiopia 
● Appeal to foreign investors: Zambezi, Ecuador and Ethiopia 
● Feasibility of alternative forms of energy: Egypt, Brazil 
 
Throughout this paper, we have seen that internal politics and economic development 
incentives can tremendously push for the building of hydropower projects such as dams, such as 
the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia. In Brazil, however, there is a consensus on the shift towards 
clean sources of energy for power generation that is both supported by the people and the 
government. This contradiction of public opinion across the world makes it very hard to reach a 
clear cost-benefit analysis for hydroelectric projects such as dams. 
In addition, we have also seen that international donor funders do not have a firm stance 
on dam construction. Western donors are skeptical about funding hydropower projects in the 
Global South. Their Chinese counterparts, however, have shown strong interest in building dams 
and funding hydropower projects not only in the Mekong River Basin but also in other river 
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basins, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Alternative sources of energy are very attractive for sustainable development efforts. 
Brazil and Egypt, for example, have shown a dedicated direction towards solar, wind and nuclear 
power to generate electricity across their cities. Yet, the question about water scarcity is still 
unsolved. Alternative sources of energy can in fact substitute other traditional power generation 
methods. But what about the water that has been reduced drastically due to climate change? 
With increasing global attention to changing climate patterns, dams emerge as a solution to 
some but part of the problem to others. 
● Some states  only superficially address environmental and social impacts 
● Institutions that support public participation can create more political power around the 
issue 
 
In many parts of the Global South dams are still seen as signs of economic development 
and a way to meet rising energy needs. This thought is reinforced by international organizations 
and other world powers, such as China, who are willing to fund large dam projects. However, 
changing weather patterns brought on by climate change are affecting the productive capabilities 
of many rivers. Damming these rivers not only inhibits the future productivity of the rivers for 
more dams but also affects the ability of local populations to utilize the river as a source of their 
livelihood. 
   Transboundary organizations are one way that these concerns can be addressed. Even if 
some of these organizations were formed with the aim of managing the water resources in a way 
that is fair for all riparian nations. However, outside forces and national interests have thus far 
inhibited the ability of these organizations to function as stewards of the rivers and its resources. 
 
 
 
51 
Transboundary organizations (TBOs) have been primarily supported by international 
institutions, but there is a push for state and regional ownership and participation. 
● This fosters regional self-sufficiency, but limits funding available 
●  Power dynamics between riparians complicate regional cooperation 
 
Many transboundary water management organizations were set up with the help and 
funding of international bodies, especially the UN. Yet, these types of arrangements mean that 
the organizations need to adhere to the rules and regulations of the outside body and are subject 
to oversight. This has led many TBOs to move towards self-funding and self-sufficiency. 
However, this typically means that the TBOs have less financial capital to work with. 
Subsequently, this inhibits the ability of the TBOs to manage the water resources. An example of 
this is the Mekong River Commission, which is gradually limiting funding from outside sources, 
which will result in a substantial overall budget reduction.  
Not only do funding sources complicate the functionality of TBOs, but it also 
complicates regional power dynamics. This is shown in the Nile case with the 
upstream/downstream contention between Ethiopia and Egypt. With no regional cooperation the 
water resources are subject to the national interests of the riparian nations, which could 
negatively impact the productive capability of the river for all riparian nations. 
Over the past few decades, hydroelectric dam projects have been seen as a way for 
countries in the Global South to gain much needed economic development while also meeting 
their energy needs. More recently there have been changes in the hydro-dam landscape, brought 
on by the ideas espoused by integrated water resource management. IWRM seeks to frame 
transboundary rivers as international bodies that require regional cooperation (in the form of 
TBOs) to manage the water resources sustainably. This focus on sustainability have induced 
some transboundary organizations to move away from hydroelectric dams in favor of other 
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renewable energy sources, while others have been able to gain more international funding for 
more hydroelectric dams. Whether or not there is a move towards more or fewer hydroelectric 
dams, the focus on sustainability, coupled with the effects of climate change, has brought to light 
many of the adverse environmental effects dams have on the productivity of rivers. As more 
attention is given to these effects the future reliability of hydroelectric energy production will be 
more at risk and more countries in the Global South will have to consider other sources of 
renewable energy. 
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